Abstract
Introduction
Multi-market competition refers to the situation in which a …rm faces at least some of the same rivals in multiple markets. 1 More speci…cally, under multimarket competition a …rm that is active across multiple markets might …nd itself competing with …rms that are also present in multi-markets and …rms that are only present in a given market. This is a pervasive phenomenon in modern economies and the subject of this paper.
Examples of multi-market competition can be found in the telecommunications, banking, and air transportation industries. Telecommunication carriers compete in mobile and …xed telephony, voice and data services with companies that provide the full gamut of services and companies that only provide a subset of the services (e.g., data services). Commercial banks offering a full portfolio of …nancial products such as insurance, home loans, personal loans and credit cards compete not only with other full service banks but also with providers that o¤er only home loans or personal loans or insurance. Full service airlines (and their discount airline subsidiaries) compete with other full service airlines and with discount airlines.
Economic conventional wisdom once suggested 2 that when …rms compete against the same rivals in multiple markets, the intensity of competition may su¤er. The mechanism(s) through which competition would be softened were not, however, well understood. Bernheim and Whinston's (1990) seminal paper suggested a mechanism through which competition would su¤er with multi-market contact: concerted or coordinated e¤ects. By considering a supergame model where …rms repeatedly compete with each other over time, these authors show that when …rms interact in multiple markets, the opportunities for punishing deviations from collusive outcomes are enhanced. As punishing deviators becomes easier under multi-market competition, it is easier to sustain cooperative outcomes. 3 We should stress that 1 See Chen and Ross (2007) . 2 See, for example, Edwards (1955) . 3 Scott (1982 Scott ( , 1983 ) uses cross-industry data and …nd a positive link between multimarket contact and pro…ts. Additional support for the hypothesis that multimarket contact leads to higher prices is also found in several single-indusry studies. Examples include Parker and Roller (1997) in telecommunications and Pillo¤ (1999) in banking. this theoretical work is by no means conclusive. The collusive equilibrium identi…ed by Bernheim and Whinston is one of the in…nite many equilibria that result from the application of the folk theorem to in…nitely-repeated games.
Our emphasis is, however, on unilateral e¤ects. We are interested in the short-run strategic interactions that arise when …rms compete across di¤erent markets. We provide a direct mechanism through which increased multi-market contact leads to higher prices.
We also explore two related questions in this paper. The …rst question is normative in nature. We examine di¤erent market structures -from no multi-market contact to full multi-market contact -and investigate market outcomes (e.g., prices and quantities) and welfare. We identify the socially optimal market structure contingent on the degree of asymmetry between the markets. The second question is positive in nature. We then ask the following question, if we allow …rms to merge, which mergers would be profitable and what would be the likely resulting market structure.
Our paper is closely related to Chen and Ross (2007) . They focused on the e¤ects of multi-market competition on prices and welfare when …rms serve two di¤erent markets with a single production facility and an increasing marginal cost technology. Although the demand functions are independent in their model, the link between the markets arises as the larger the production in one market, the higher the marginal cost in the other market. These authors then use this framework to explain phenomena that are not fully understood in competition analysis: the issues of recoupment (lower prices in one market are compensated by higher prices in other markets) and retaliatory entry. In contrast, our model considers interdependent demands and focuses on the impacts of mergers on prices, welfare and market structure with constant marginal costs.
Our analysis of multi-market competition has potentially important implications for competition law and policy. Standard merger analysis is concerned with price and welfare e¤ects in the relevant market -a market that is de…ned essentially by the substitution possibilities. Our analysis suggests that although goods might not be in the same relevant market from the point of view of competition law, under multi-market competition a merger might have more complex e¤ects (both positive and negative) beyond the immediate relevant market. It stands to reason that competition analysis should take such e¤ects into consideration.
The Basic Setup
We consider preferences for goods 1 and 2 represented by the following social welfare function:
where m represents all other goods in the economy. The inverse demand curves for the two goods are given by:
and
The parameter measures the degree of product di¤erentiation. If = 0, the demand for the two goods are independent. If > 0 the two goods are substitutes, and the two goods are complements if < 0. The analysis in this paper focuses on the case of substitutes. We assume that the marginal costs of production in markets 1 and 2 are equal to c 1 and c 2 , respectively, and that there are no …xed costs. Under this framework, the total surplus (denoted by T S) is derived from the utility function given in Equation 1.
Consumer surplus (CS) is de…ned as T S
, where is the sum of …rms'
pro…ts.
The following de…nition is helpful in keeping our notations as simple as possible:
De…nition 1 Let a ( 1 c 1 ) ( 2 c 2 ) and 1 c 1 = 1. Without loss of generality, assume a 0.
The index a summarises the asymmetry between the two markets. For a = 0, the two markets are symmetric.
We discuss three market structures in this paper. In our benchmark market structure (see Figure 1) , there are two …rms (A and B) that produce good 1 and two …rms (C and D) that produce good 2. Firms compete by setting quantities. This simple framework allows us to capture both closer intra-market competition (e.g., between …rms A and B) and also more distant inter-market competition (e.g., between …rms in market 1 and …rms in market 2). Moreover, it also allows us to investigate the consequences of changes in the market structure that a¤ect intra and inter-market competition. In particular, we will consider a market structure where …rms A and C and are allowed to o¤er both goods while facing di¤erent rivals in each market (see Figure 2) . We refer to this market structure as partial multi-market contact. In the last structure we consider, both A and C and B and D have merged so that these two …rms compete with each other in both markets (see Figure 3) . We refer to this as full market contact (F). 
Market Equilibrium
In this subsection we characterise the market equilibria under the various market structures. This is presented in Table 1 below. As the degree of asymmetry, a, increases, …rms cease o¤ering product 2. Di¤erent market structures have di¤erent critical a values for corner solutions to eventuate.
Since multi-market …rms have more incentives to exit market 2 to internalise the externality between the two markets, the critical value a is the the lowest in market structure F (a 1 ) and the highest in market structure B (a
3 ). For market structure P, the critical value of a is in between the other two cases, a 3 , all market structures give the same market outcome with Q 2 = 0, we present the analysis for the case a < 3 2 3 : All proofs are in the appendix. Omitted for simplicity, in all cases, the consumer surplus is computed as:
In the next section, we illustrate how the two fundamental e¤ects -the selection and the internalisation of the Cournot externality e¤ects -drive the strategic interaction among …rms in the three market structures.
Prices and Welfare
In this subsection we present price and welfare comparison across the three market structures. The proposition below shows that prices for both goods are always higher under full multi-market contact. This is intuitive since the multi-market …rm has less incentives to expand its output. Output expansion in one market hurts not only its pro…tability in the given market, but also the pro…tability in the other market. In the tables, we use superscript B (P , F ) to denote variables for market structure B (P, F). Table 2 below. Proof. With market outputs given in Table 1 , market prices are computed through Equations 2 and 3. The price comparison is straightforward, and the proof is not included here. The proof is available upon request.
Proposition 1 The ranking of market prices is summarised in
While Proposition 1 is perhaps not surprising, the welfare comparison is less straightforward as indicated in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The welfare ranking is summarised in Table 3 . Proof. See the Appendix.
The results in Proposition 2 re ‡ects the tension between the selection effect (shutting down the ine¢ cient …rms is bene…cial) and the internalisation of the Cournot externality e¤ect (reducing the production of good 2 allows …rms to sustain a higher price for good 1). These two e¤ects are in ‡uenced by the degree of asymmetry (a) between markets 1 and 2 and the degree of substitutability ( ) between goods 1 and 2.
From the consumer's point of view, market structure B always yields the highest surplus since prices are the lowest. However, as a increases, the asymmetry between the two markets increases, and social welfare may increase with the presence of multi-market …rms since there is more e¢ ciency gain from reducing the production of good 2. Therefore, with a low a, the social welfare is the highest in market structure B. As a gets very large, market structure F dominates. Market structure P is the best for intermediate values of a. Note that all the critical a values listed in Table 3 decrease as increases. The band for market structure P to maximise the social welfare is the widest for intermediate values of .
Endogenous Mergers
This section examines two related questions. First, we ask what mergers are pro…table in each market structure. For the full multi-market structure, there is only one merger possible -a merger from two …rms producing the two goods to a single …rm producing two goods. Such merger to monopoly is clearly pro…table. The determination of the pro…tability of mergers for the two other market structures is more complex and it is summarised by Propositions 3 and 4 below. These propositions also allow us to answer a second question: what market structure is more likely to arise in an environment where the benchmark …rms were allowed to pursue any pro…table mergers? We present the key factors in these two propositions, and the detailed conditions are available in the appendix.
Proposition 3
Conditions for pro…table mergers in the benchmark market structure are summarised in Table 4 .
Inter-market Proof. See the Appendix.
We should note that for the merger between three …rms -for example, …rms A, B, and C -the merger pro…tability analysis is undertaken against the pre merger pro…ts, A , B , and C . This is the standard approach.
Di¤erent answers may be obtained if the reference point is a two-…rm merger …rst -for example, …rms A and B -followed by the pro…tability analysis of adding another …rm -for example, …rm C -into this coalition.
Proposition 3 suggests that whether or not an intra-market merger is pro…table depends only on . For = 0, the two markets are independent, and an intra-market merger is simply a merger between duopolists to form a monopolist. Such a merger is always pro…table. This suggests that under our set-up with both inter and intra competition, a merger of the two …rms within one market is only pro…table if the two markets are relatively isolated.
Proposition 3 also shows that an inter-market merger is pro…table for large a. In particular, a two-…rm inter-market merger is only pro…table in the parameter range where the merged entity ceases production in market 2.
The merged entity produces more of good 1 and shuts down the production of good 2. This yields higher pro…ts in market 1 when a is large. In this case it is also easier for this merger to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints as the …rm in market 2 would have lower pre-merger pro…t.
For a merger between three …rms (inter-plus intra-market merger), the condition required is typically a large a. A lower reduces the threshold a required. It is possible for a three-…rm merger to be pro…table for small a and relatively isolated markets (
). In this parameter range (a
), the asymmetry between the markets is small and e¢ ciency gains are therefore low. The merged entity continues to produce both goods. For a merger to be pro…table, it must then involve …rms with a large combined output in the market. This result is analogous to the classic result of Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) that a merger among symmetric …rms is not pro…table unless it involves 80% of the …rms in the industry.
The proposition below summarises the pro…tability analysis for mergers under partial multi-market contact.
Proposition 4
Conditions for pro…table mergers with partial multi-market contact are summarised in Table 5 . Proof. See the Appendix.
Since a merger in this market structure involves both intra-and intermarket merger, in general, pro…table mergers require to be small and a to be large. An exception is the pro…table AD merger for the parameter range, a
. In this case, the asymmetry is small between the two markets, there is no corner solution and the merged entity would continue to produce both products. Thus, A and D would only have the incentives to merge if a is small and …rm D also has signi…cant pre merger output share.
These propositions also allow us to consider the following question. Starting with the benchmark, if …rms A and C were to merge, would …rms B and D …nd it pro…table to merge (resulting in structure F ) or would B and D prefer to stay separate (resulting in structure P )? From the benchmark, …rms A and C only have the incentive to merge for high values of a. Furthermore, the critical a value for pro…table AC merger in market structure B is higher than the critical a value for pro…table BD merger in market structure P. Therefore, if AC merger is pro…talbe, …rms B and D would always have the incentive to merge. For high values of a, market dynamics might naturally result in a market structure where …rms operate in multiple markets. Importantly, for high values of a, market structure F yields the highest social welfare. 4 Note that for intermediate values of a, structure P maximises social welfare but this structure is unlikely to emerge given that the associated merger is not pro…table.
With the inclusion of both inter-and intra-market competition, …rst, there exists endogenous mergers. Even with the presence of the outsider …rms, some …rms would still have the incentives to merge. The optimal market structure depends on both a and . The welfare e¤ects of merger thus also depend on both a and .
Conclusion
This paper examines a simple model of multi-market competition. It shows that when …rms compete in quantity, although full multi-market contact might lead to higher prices, the welfare consequences are more complex and depend on how two fundamental forces play themselves out. The …rst is the selection e¤ect, which works towards increasing welfare as shutting down the ine¢ cient …rm is bene…cial. The second opposing e¤ect is the internalisation of the Cournot externality e¤ect; reducing the production of good 2 allows …rms to sustain a higher price for good 1. This works towards increasing prices and, therefore, decreasing the consumer surplus (but increasing the producer surplus). These two e¤ects are in ‡uenced by the degree of asymmetry between markets 1 and 2 (a) and the degree of substitutability ( ) between goods 1 and 2. The higher a is, the more relatively ine¢ cient market 2 is, and the stronger the selection e¤ect. The higher is, the more closely linked the two markets are and the stronger the externality e¤ect would be. A merger would internalise the e¤ects more when is large. This would make the merged entity a lot less aggressive and hence unlikely to raise pro…ts for the merged entity. On top of this, a lower would imply more isolated markets and would make intra-market merger more pro…table. Therefore, the general result is that merger is more likely to be pro…table when is low.
This analysis should be viewed as a preliminary step towards understanding the dynamics of multi-market competition. It simply illustrates that mergers can increase welfare under multi-market competition. Although this result is not per se new 5 , its novelty arises from the fact the increase in welfare might not originate from the market (as strictly de…ned from a competition analysis perspective) where the merger takes place but instead from a related market. This raises important issues for merger analysis under competition law.
This framework, however, can be generalised in a number of directions.
There are four major areas that deserve further examination. First, it is important to understand how the two e¤ects identi…ed in the paper -the selection and internalisation of externality e¤ects -play themselves out when there are more than two …rms in both markets. It is important to understand how an increase in the number of competitors a¤ects their impacts on both inter-and intra-markets competition. Second, one can explicitly consider the existence of common …xed costs across markets (synergies). This will strengthen the selection e¤ect and may also mean greater gains under full multi-market contact. Third, we can extend the framework to consider other pricing schemes. For example, we can allow …rms that o¤er the two products to compete by o¤ering bundles. We conjecture that this can lead to very …erce competition under full multi-market contact. Fourth, we can use this simple framework to consider the scope for a …rm that o¤ers the two goods to behave anti-competitively in order to exclude rivals from one of the markets.
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Appendix
Market equilibrium in three market structures: For a …rm i operating in market j only, the optimisation problem is max q i (P j c j ) q i . For a multi-product …rm i operating in both markets, the optimisaiton problem is
, where q i1 and q i2 are the multi-product …rm's quantity choices in the two markets. (2) Market structure P: Solving for the three …rms'optimisation problems respectively gives the following best responses:
, and
This gives the interior solutions:
( +3) (3 ) , and q D =
3(1 a)
( +3)(3 ) : With production in both markets, …rm A has more incentive to exit market 2 as a gets large. For q A2 = 0,
, and q D = 
: Solving the four best responses simultaneously gives the interior solutions:
3( +1) (1 ) and q A2 = q B2 = 
: Note that 1 (9 3 4 2 )(3 2 ) 3(9 2 2 ) 3 2 
Note that
1 : 
:
Case 3 (a
Proof. of Proposition 3: Case 1 (
A merges with C, and B and D remain separated, the market structure becomes that of market structure P. Firms A and C would have the incentive to merge if
2 . This holds for a (ii) A merges with B: The merged …rm has the best response:
: For …rm i in market 2, the best response is q i = 1 a q AB q j 2
.
Firms A and B would have the incentive to merge if
This holds for 
: Firms C and D would have incentives to merge if
2 : This holds for ,
: For the given parameter range, the …rm ABC would cease to o¤er good 2: In equilibrium,
4 2 . Firms A, B, and C would have incentives to merge if
This holds for ): (i) A and C merge: Firms A and C would have the incentive to merge since in this case
(ii) A and (1 ) 2 (3 2 (1 a))
This holds for : For …rm B, the best response is
. This gives the interior solution:
, and q B = This holds in this case. Therefore, …rms A and D would have the incentive to merge if 1 .
(iv) B merges with D: If …rms B and D merge, the market structure is the same as market structure F. Both …rms A and BD do not o¤er good 2.
Firms B and D would have the incentive to merge if
The conditions are the same as the ones for pro…table AD merger.
Case 2 ( 
This holds for a 3(1+ 2 )(1 )
: Note that
0:77: Note also that 3(1+ 2 )(1 )
(iii) It is more pro…table for A to merge with D rather than B if 18a 18 18a + 9a 2 + 5 2 + 13 36 (1 + ) (1 )
This holds for a 3(1 )(2 )(8+8 +2 2 3 ) p
1 .
(iv) B merges with D: The market structure is the same as market structure F. In this parameter range, both …rms o¤er both goods. Firms B This holds for a This holds for a 3 5 3 . Note that :
